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Article: 
E-E has written a concise exposition of the classical ethological view of human behavior. The ethology of 
Lorenz and his followers has been incisively criticized by Lehrman and others, but it appears from E-E's essay 
that these criticisms have brought about no major modifications of the thinking of classical ethology. 
 
I would like to discuss certain logical fallacies that are evident in E-E's interpretations of key experiments and 
studies, specifically the deprivation experiment and the study of cross-culturally universal behaviors. 
 
According to both E-E and Lorenz (op. cit., 1965), if an individual is deprived of an opportunity to learn a 
species-typical behavior, be it a song or a smile, by observing conspecifics performing that behavior, and if that 
individual nonetheless perforrns the species-typical behavior, then the behavior must be "innate," "encoded in 
the genome" or the genetic "blueprint" for a nervous system. I maintain that it is fallacious to draw any 
conclusion about the genetic inheritance of a behavior pattern from an environmental deprivation experiment. 
The improper inference made by classical ethologists follows from a dogmatic restriction of the causes of 
species-typical behavior to two classes of phenomena: observation learning, or imitation, and genetic coding, 
presumably in DNA molecules. 
 
If all possible causes of a behavior pattern can legitimately be dichotomized, then of course an experiment 
which yields results that exclude one cause. therefore compels the researcher to affirm the complementary 
cause, and it does so with all the authority of simple logical reasoning. II the possible causes cannot be neatly 
dichotomized, then no conclusion about the cause of a behavior can be drawn from an experiment which allows 
the exclusion of only one cause. 
 
Suppose there is an urn known to contain only black and white marbles, If one marble is drawn and it is found 
to be not black, is therefore white. No further inves1igation is necessary to assert this conclusion, because prior 
investigation has already established that the entire stock of marbles from which the sample was drawn consists 
of only two kinds. However, if the urn contains black, white, red, green, yellow, and blue marbles, and if it is 
established only that a marble drawn from the urn is not black, then there is no way of determining its actual 
color without further investigation. It could quite plausibly be either white, red, green, yellow, or blue. 
 
If we look at the life of an animal, it is obvious that a vast array of mechanisms are active in its development 
from conception to the lime it first displays some species-typical behavior. Some well-known mechanisms 
include the following: (1) the set of chromosomes, or the "genome," determined at fertilization; (2) host of 
organelles and macromolecules in the cytoplasm of the zygote; (3) spatial configuration of the cellular 
components of the zygote; (4) the external environment of the zygote with its characteristic temperature, pH, 
salinity, osmolarity, and so forth; (5) environmental factors such as nutrients and viruses which are absorbed 
and in some cases assimilated by the organism; (6) the web of interactions among components within each cell 
during development; (7) the numerous interactions among the diverse cells comprising the developing 
organism; (8) in birds and mammals, maternal or parental care; (9) exercise by the organism; and so on. A 
further mechanism may also be observation of conspecifics performing a species-typical behavior. 
 
If a deprivation experiment is carefully conducted so that two random samples of animals from-a single 
population are reared in two environments which differ in only one respect - opportunity to observe a 
conspecific performing a particular behavior - and if the animals in the deprived environment nonetheless 
perform the species-typical behavior, then one and only one thing can be concluded: observation of 
performance by a conspecific is not necessary for normal performance of the behavior. Such an experimental 
result does not prove that the behavior is encoded in the genes (mechanism 1 above). Neither does it prove it to 
be encoded in the Cytoplasmic organelles (mechanism 2) or any other of mechanisms 3 through 9 cited above. 
 
This basic point has been made by Jensen (1961), Kuo (1967), Whalen (1971) and, most lucidly and eloquently, 
by Lehrman (op. cit., 1953, 1970); yet the classical ethologists maintain their dogmatic view of the deprivation 
experiment. 
 
When Lorenz and E-E conclude from this kind of result that the behavior is "encoded in the genome," they are 
in effect uncritically accepting the null hypothesis, which may constitute what is termed a Type II error in 
statistical inference. They in effect hypothesize a priori that the behavior is “innate”, and from this null 
hypothesis they predict that the animals reared in normal and deprived environments will behave the same way. 
If there is no significant difference between the two groups, then they accept the null hypothesis as true. This is 
a serious error of logical reasoning. 
 
The only way to draw a valid conclusion about the role of genes in species-typical behavior is to vary the genes 
themselves, perhaps through a mutation or selective breeding, and demonstrate that the behavior varies as a 
consequence. Because heredity consists of more than Mendelian genes in chromosomes special crossing 
experiments must be done to dissect the contributions of Mendelian inheritance from numerous other 
mechanisms of inheritance (see Wahlsten, 1979) and establish that the behavior is indeed "encoded in the 
genome." 
 
Investigations of the songs of isolated birds, the babbling of human neonates, the smiles of the blind, or the 
greeting gestures of primitive peoples are relevant and informative for students of behavior, but none of these 
studies can provide proof that behavior is "encoded in the genome" or "innate." The deprivation experiment is 
only one of many techniques for the analysis of behavior, and  the knowledge which can be gleaned from its 
results is narrowly circumscribed. 
 
Consider further the case where experiential deprivation does indeed disrupt species-typical behavior. This 
certainly demonstrates the plasticity of the behavior in question, but it does not in any way prove that the 
"genome" is irrelevant for performance of the behavior, The chromosomes may play an important role in the 
development of a nervous system capable of rapidly acquiring information through observation. 
 
It seems to me that the classical ethologists have responded to previous criticisms of their doctrine by adopting 
an eclectic approach in order to blunt the  effects of further criticism. On the one hand, they stubbornly cling to 
their original ideas, while on the other, they incorporate criticisms into their writings in the form of disclaimers 
that they really mean what their words appear to mean. This is apparent in the essay by E-E.  
 
For example, in his abstract he presents a very clear dichotomy of causes of behavior by asserting that "innate 
and culturally evolved patterns of behavior can often substitute as functional equivalents for one another." Then 
at the end of section 3 he contradicts himself: "I wish to emphasize that the whole nature/nurture issue should 
not be considered as a matter of either/or, nor can the contribution of each be measured quantitatively, in terms 
of percentages." Now, what is substitution, if not a matter of "either/or?"  
 
In the section on cross-cultural comparison, E-E begins with this disclaimer: "The fact of their universal 
appearance alone does not allow us to deduce that these patterns are innate in man." There seems to be a two-
step process of reasoning implicit in this statement. First is the inductive inference that a behavioral pattern 
which appears in every one of a sample of cultures is universal, that is, occurs with probability 1.0. Second is 
the deduction drawn from the classical ethological theory that universality means the pattern is innate. 
 
An inductive inference may be made on the basis of "circumstantial" evidence, and it always has a certain 
probability of being incorrect because of sampling error. A deduction from theory, on the other hand, should be 
made with mathematical certainty. It is a very inadequate theory that yields deductions which are only 
“probable,” such that they may or may not follow from the theory.  
 
Consequently, E-E becomes mired when he further states that patterns of expressive behavior which are 
virtually the same in all respects in many cultures provide "strongly suggestive circumstantial evidence for the 
hypothesis that they constitute phylogenetic adaptations," and when he speaks of "universals which can be said, 
with a high degree of probability, to constitute phylogenetic adaptations.” These phrases clearly show that E-E 
has no doubts that the patterns are universal. Rather, he vacillates over the statement: Universal, therefore 
innate. 
 
Evidence presented in this essay and other publications by E-E is not sufficient to convince me that the 
behavioral patterns in question are in fact universal, but in any event, the universality of a behavior does not 
prove its genetic encoding. The method of cross-cultural comparison has the same drawback as the deprivation 
experiment; it provides no direct evidence for genetic determination of the specific pattern of behavior. At best 
it provides "circumstantial evidence" in support of the hypothesis of "innate" behavior. Nevertheless, 
circumstantial evidence, unlike direct evidence obtained by manipulating genes themselves, cannot constitute 
proof that the hypothesis is true. It is logically fallacious to assert otherwise. 
 
